Niccolo Machiavelli's "The Prince": A Textbook for Diplomacy
by Tim Hoyt
(Token Disclaimer: In the interest of political correctness, it is
appropriate to note that most people consider the adjective "Machiavellian" both
pejorative and demeaning: it is usually used as an insult. Most people have not
read "The Prince", but almost certainly have an opinion about it anyway. I would
not recommend that anyone bring up this article in polite company, or that
anyone take the musings of the author as in any way suggesting that Machiavelli
was anything other than a thug, a fascist, and a blackguard: such ideas simply
won't do in the enlightened New World Order which, as we know, represents the
end of history. The Author neither confirms nor denies that he has actually read
"The Prince", or that it influences his Diplomacy play in the slightest, and if
questioned in a court of law will dissemble to the best of his ability.
Obviously, any negative repercussions for this fall strictly on Doug Kent's
head-he's responsible, so blame him. This may seem Machiavellian to you: well,
in the words of Frances Urquhart, you might think so, but I certainly couldn't
comment.)
Niccolo Machiavelli's often-slandered volume "The Prince", written in 1513,
remains one of the single most important works in Western political thought, and
represents one of the fundamental readings in Western political science. "The
Prince" was written in response to the decay of the Italian states-system. For
over a century, Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papacy, and the Kingdom of Naples
had vied for supremacy in the Italian peninsula, changing alliances and policies
in order to ensure that no one state became supreme. Late in the 15th century,
in an effort to change the regional balance of power, Italian states invited
first France and later the Hapsburg Empire (Spain and Austria, at the time) to
participate in inter-Italian warfare. The outside powers proved overwhelmingly
powerful: even coalitions of all five Italian states failed to successfully
resist French and Hapsburg armies. By the middle of the 16th century, Italy had
become a battleground for the ambitions of France and the Empire, and the
Italian states found their sovereignty and freedom of action declining as they
relied increasingly on alliances with one or the other of the two "great
powers".
This may sound familiar. Seven powers, two at "the corners" (in this case,
France and the Empire), with the central powers attempting to maintain a balance
of power and the "Wicked Witches" ultimately struggling for hegemony. I suspect
that many of us have played Diplomacy games which followed this script virtually
to the letter. The wars of the Italian states, in fact, represent the first real
"balance of power" system in modern Western history. Avalon Hill produced a game
called "Machiavelli", based on this struggle with the addition of an eighth
power, the perfidious Ottomans (who spend a lot of time lurking about in the
eastern Mediterranean). The rules are much more complicated than Diplomacy, and
much more subtle, which may be one reason the game never caught on in a big way.
(I've got a set, but have never actually played the damn thing <grin>).
Machiavelli wrote "The Prince" for Lorenzo de Medici, ruler of Florence. It
was intended as a primer of sorts: a distillation of Machiavelli's service in
the Italian wars to date and a reflection on recent Italian history. The intent,
from Machiavelli's perspective, was to help Medici rule in such a way that not
only ensured his survival and that of his dynasty, but also in a way that would
permit Italy to be free of foreign occupation and invasion. One of the last
lines of the book reads "THIS BARBARIAN OCCUPATION STINKS IN THE NOSTRILS OF ALL
OF US", and the last chapter (XXVI) is entitled "Exhortation to Free Italy From
the Barbarians". Much of the text is related to the duties of the Prince
regarding his internal problems: when to oppress, when to cajole, when to bribe,
and that sort of thing. Some of these passages are interesting for Diplomacy
players as well, but most of this article will reflect on Machiavelli's
observations of the international system as he knew it. His perspective, in many
ways, can be compared to that of a Diplomacy player with three centers in the
end game: he knows what went wrong, and has some good ideas about how to fix it,
but it may simply be too late.
That said, let's take a look at some of Machiavelli's recommendations, and
apply them to Diplomacy. I've taken the liberty of organizing them into several
categories for consideration. I've included the Chapter and line numbers of each
passage for those who are inclined to look them up.
GENERAL STRATEGY:
III:146-149, 165-168) The Romans in these matters acted as all wise princes
should, having regard not only to present ills but to future ones as well and
preparing for the latter with all possible care. For if evils are anticipated
they can be easily remedied...On this account they were willing to make war with
Philip and Antiochus [leaders of other empires] in Greece rather than have to
fight them in Italy though at the time they could have avoided either course.
III:253-254) a war is never avoided but merely postponed to your
disadvantage.
Diplomacy is, ultimately, a game of conquest. To win, you have to grab half
of Europe, arranging and discarding alliances with gleeful abandon as you stomp
your way to rightful hegemony. Using that perspective, it makes sense to assume
that every state is an enemy, and that war is inevitable. Cooperation, as we
shall see below, has dividends, and is absolutely necessary to win the game. But
refraining from involvement in a conflict may simply mean that when you go to
war with the winner, it will be on their terms and they will be stronger for
having defeated their present opponent. One of the most fundamental errors in
Diplomacy is to rest on your laurels, especially in the midgame. Just because
you've knocked out your neighbor and feel secure doesn't mean that you don't
have enemies. Your neighbor's neighbor, who was probably your ally in the recent
war, has just become a threat. (See the article on "Kautilya" a couple of issues
ago, the author notes with a shameless plug. What was the deal on royalties for
back issues, Doug?). And whoever you have been allied with is going to be either
looking at you with visions of barbecue sauce and some minced onion, or else is
about to continue expanding in other venues, and when he gets strong enough
you'll be the next meal. Sorry, folks, but the war isn't over until you control
the world. BWA HA HA HA!
GENEROSITY AND INJURY
VIII:138-142) For injuries should be given committed all at once so that,
there being less time to feel them, they give less offense, and favors should be
dealt out a few at a time so that their effect may be more enduring.
XVI:76-83) among the things a prince must guard against is precisely the
danger of becoming an object either of contempt or hatred. Generosity leads you
to both these evils, wherefore it is wiser to accept the name of miserly...than
to seek a reputation for generosity...
There is no greater injury you can do to someone than to stab them.
Therefore, in the words of the Bard, "...'tis best done quickly..." Every
alliance has tensions: it's hard for two people seeking to maximize advantage at
the expense of the other while still cooperating not to have minor, or indeed
major, disagreements. The single worst thing you can do is to try to weasel your
way a little bit at a time while the other guy's busy elsewhere. "Gee, I just
took Rumania-it's not really a stab, and you don't lose anything because you got
a center somewhere else..." Don't spend a lot of time whining, either: "PLEEZ
can I have Rum, sniff sniff". These kinds of things may make your ally, with
whom things seemed to be going so swimmingly while you were getting your way,
just turn around and smack you upside the head. If you're going to put the knife
in, do it well, in a way that really hurts. If you're not willing to stab yet,
quit your complaining and do something productive. In the words of the great
Bogart (sorry, I'm in a literary mood), "I don't mind parasites-it's cut rate
ones I can't stand."
Generosity is another issue. In an effort to be cooperative, some people give
away the store. Sure, why not give Turkey Rumania early in the game-it's no
biggie if the Sultan will be your ally. NOT! If you give up important stuff to
easily, your ally or neighbors may think you're soft, which is a good way to
find yourself in exile somewhere like sunny Yakutsk or scenic Devil's Island. Or
even that island in the Orkneys that humans can't live on any more because the
British government was testing interesting weapons on it in the Second World
War...
"POWER POLITICS":
XVIII:78-83) In actions of all men and especially of princes, where there is
no court of appeal, the end is all that counts. Let a prince then concern
himself with the acquisition or the maintenance of a state; the means employed
will always be considered honorable and praised by all, for the mass of mankind
is always swayed by appearances and the outcome of an enterprise.
XVII:28-38) Here the question arises; whether it is better to be loved than
feared or feared than loved. The answer is that it would be desirable to be both
but, since that is difficult, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one
must choose. For on men in general this observation may be made: they are
ungrateful, fickle, and deceitful, eager to avoid dangers, and avid for gain,
and while you are useful to them they are all with you, offering you their
blood, their property, their lives and their sons so long as danger is
remote...but when it approaches they turn on you.
Gee, and you wondered why "Machiavellian" is considered a bad word? Well,
Machiavelli was practical: he knew the difference between the society he lived
in and the way idealists wanted to live. The same is true today, although our
society is one hell of a lot closer to an ideal one than 16th century Italy.
Freedom has always had its price: part of that price is the rule of law, and the
costs of law and order are, in some instances, repression, deceit, and fear. In
Diplomacy, the only law is force: if you can't defend yourself, nobody else will
volunteer to help you unless they get something out of it. The problem with
being loved is that it won't necessarily keep you from getting trampled.
Everybody in this game has the same victory conditions, and the odds are that
sooner or later, you will be a target. It's a nasty, dog-eat-dog world out
there, so for goodness sake don't be a cat.
ON LYING:
XVIII:27-30) a wise leader cannot and should not keep his word when keeping
it is not to his advantage or when the reasons that made him give it are no
longer valid.
XVIII:54-57)It is good to appear clement, trustworthy, humane, religious, and
honest, and also to be so, but always with the mind so disposed that, when the
occasion arises not to be so, you can become the opposite.
See above. Let's be honest: one problem with a game like Diplomacy is that
people can take it personally. It is, in fact, something we all probably do once
in a while. Let's also remember that it is a game. I recently had a private
exchange with another player after a stab. He took it pretty well, but argued
strongly that keeping one's word is both a better means of play and also a more
effective one. I'm ambivalent, at best, about both arguments. Actions taken in
Diplomacy should have no more bearing on one's moral character than actions on a
stage: it is a game, a role, and does not in any way necessarily reflect one's
personal standards or beliefs. As a more effective means of play, there is some
truth to that, particularly in a gaming community where reputations are known.
"Cross-gaming", which is frequently condemned, is a part of life: a player with
a reputation for honesty and an utter lack of double-dealing will gain more
allies in the long-run than one who is known to stab everyone at the first
opportunity. On the other hand, that player will also frequently get hammered by
less scrupulous allies once his usefulness is over. Even nasty Machiavellian
player's can cultivate a reputation for honesty and integrity, within limits.
ALLIANCES:
XXI:40-47) A prince is also esteemed when he shows himself a true friend or a
true enemy, that is, when, without reservation, he takes his stand with one side
or the other. This is always wiser than trying to be neutral, for if two
powerful neighbors of yours fall out they are either of such sort that the
victor may give you reason to fear him or they are not. In either case it will
be better for you to take sides and wage an honest war.
XXI:72-81) if the prince chooses his side boldly, and his ally wins, even
though the latter be powerful and the prince be at his mercy, nonetheless there
is a bond of obligation and friendship...if your ally be the loser then he will
welcome you and, as long as he can, he will give you aid...
XXI:82-91) when the two contestants are of such stature that you will have
nothing to fear from the victor, it is even more prudent to take part in the war
for you will accomplish the ruin of one with the aid of the other who, had he
been wise, should rather have supported him. For with your aid he is sure to win
and, winning, put himself in your power. And here it should be noted that a
prince should never ally himself with one more powerful to attack another unless
absolutely driven by necessity...
III:111-114) one,,,must make himself a leader and defender of his less
powerful neighbors and strive to weaken the stronger ones...
XIX:13-15) a prince will be despised if he is considered changeable,
frivolous...cowardly, or irresolute...
The meat of the Diplomacy game, with apologies to vegetarians, is the
necessity to ally with other players, and get them to help you win. Players who
have mastered the art of Diplomacy still don't win every game, or even half
their games, over time. But the passages above provide some useful hints on how
to view the utility of given alliances. If you are already engaged in a war,
neutrality in a second conflict may be the best option. If you are not engaged
in a war, and two of your neighbors begin fighting, neutrality is an extremely
weak option. You must always be looking ahead to see what other powers are
growing, and allow these perceptions to guide your alliance choices in the
middle game. Ensure that others do not grow strong by allying with their weak
enemies: a modest commitment of units on your part can severely slow the growth
of your potential competitors. Allying with a stronger power to attack someone
must only be done in extreme circumstances. To paraphrase Winston Churchill in
1941, when England allied with the Soviet Union to defeat Hitler: "To defeat my
enemies I would sup with the Devil himself, but I should make sure to use a long
spoon."
NEW PLAYERS AND SUBSTITUTES:
XVIII: 57-61) It must be understood that a prince and particularly a new
prince cannot practice all the virtues for which men are accounted good, for the
necessity of the state often compels him to take actions which are opposed to
loyalty, charity, humanity, and religion.
XXIV: 4-9) For the actions of a new prince are much more closely scrutinized
than those of an established one, and when they are seen to be intelligent and
effective they may win over more men and create stronger bonds of obligation
than have been felt in the old line, inasmuch as the minds of men are wrapped up
in the present and not in the past.
These words are particularly addressed to new players and substitutes. The
quickest way to get beaten in your first few games is to trust too much. People
are going to try to wax you, and you have to be prepared to do unto others.
Substitutes in mail games, both snail and electronic, face a slightly different
situation: they have inherited positions (usually inferior) from players who
simply didn't give a damn. Often, their position is complicated by an NMR (no
move received) the previous turn. In these circumstances, survival often calls
for the most drastic of power politics: lie early, lie often, do whatever it
takes to secure support and keep it for a few turns, and make it clear that you
have not joined the game to provide dinner for the other piranhas, but have a
little nibbling of your own to do before you go. Offer accommodation, if
necessary, but drive a hard bargain: if you're going to ally with someone, try
to make it contingent on joint moves against a third party. Don't wait for
others to approach you, though-they're looking at you as lunch.
CONCLUSION:
XXI: 101-106) Let no state think that it can always adopt a safe course;
rather should it be understood that all choices involve risks, for the order of
things is such that one never escapes one danger without incurring another;
prudence lies in weighing the disadvantages of each choice and taking the least
bad as good.
This is, in this author's humble opinion, one of the most important facts of
both international relations and Diplomacy (the game and the practice). Every
action has consequences, and every decision has good and bad aspects. The best
outcome can always be doubted and questioned, because perfection is
unattainable. The defeat of the Soviet Union after forty years of Cold War has
not provided the utopian world sought by idealists: instead, we have seen the
Gulf War (which we won but lost, since Saddam Hussein is still around), changing
security requirements which have increased the role of U.S. and multi-national
forces in ethnic conflicts around the globe, increased concerns over the
proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons in the developing world.
At the time of this writing (9 February 1996) the "People's Republic" of
China is preparing massive military maneuvers off the coast of Taiwan (also
known as the "Republic of China"), and demanded that the U.S. cease all arms
shipments to Taiwan. New evidence has recently been released that the PRC is
selling sophisticated missile guidance technology to Iran, and has provided both
ballistic missiles and critical nuclear weapons production components to
Pakistan. U.S. law states that the President must impose economic sanctions on
China for all of these violations. Business and economic interests argue that we
cannot afford to risk access to the Chinese market or the loss of trade from
that country. The Chinese government, noted for such staunch humanist measures
as genocide in Tibet, running over student protesters with tanks, execution and
imprisonment of democratic activists, and condoning both infanticide and slave
labor, has recently announced a return to sounder ideological principles: a
euphemism, perhaps, for yet another anti-democracy purge. Lest I sound like an
unrepentant Cold Warrior, let me state categorically that the New World Order is
unquestionably a safer and more just world than the Cold War international
system. But without stooping to China-bashing, it doesn't take a genius to see
that not every country subscribes to our ideals, and that states still use force
to achieve goals which they cannot reach through other means. Don't throw your
copy of "The Prince" out yet-it's going to be useful for more than just
Diplomacy for some time to come.
Reprinted from Diplomacy World 77
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