Conflict in Silesia
Planning
For The Inevitable War Between Germany and Russia
by
Stephen Agar
Long
ago, Richard Sharp promoted the theory that Germany usually thrives when Austria
thrives (or at the very least Germany does well when Austria manages to stick
around for a while), and the available statistics appear to bear this out.
However, is this really the full story? The purpose of this article is to
suggest that Germany in fact does well when Russia does badly and while Russia
doing badly and Austria doing well may be different sides of the same coin, that
is not always the case. I would doubt if a Turkish invasion of Austria holds
quite the same long-term horrors for Germany as a successful Russian invasion,
while a successful attack on Austria by Italy is probably only bad for German
prospects if it is accompanied (as it so often is) by Russian gains in Austria
as well. This slightly different approach would have some ramifications for
Germany strategy over and above the Anchluss which
we all know and love.
Having
GM'd 30+ games of Diplomacy, after a while you do start to notice patterns
creeping into the games. One common situation is to see Germany and Russia
slagging it out for control of Berlin and Warsaw by about 1904, sometime Germany
is victorious and (unlike Hitler) reaches Moscow, on other occasions Russia
triumphs and the whole of Germany falls. Often the victor is the Power who
strikes first. Conflict between Russia and Germany is, in my view, generally
inevitable once mid-game is reached. That being the case, I would argue that a
successful strategy for Germany will take this into account from day one.
The
Polish Battleground
Few
Russias open with A(War)-Sil and even fewer Germany's try A(Mun)-Sil or
A(Ber)-Pru. After all, there are the neutrals to pick up and there is a need to
sort out an alliance structure amongst near neighbours. But once the initial
land-grab is over, where does Germany get the next few centres from?
If
all is going well for Germany he will be in an alliance with either France or
England against the other. In the event of a Franco-German alliance you would
expect to see Germany build F(Kie) to threaten English interests in Scandinavia
and the North Sea, while France tackles England direct. While England is slowly
taken out, France moves into the Mediterranean and Germany goes... where? Well,
intervening in Scandinavia may already have brought Germany into conflict with
Russia and if you're building A(Mun) and A(Ber) it is just ever so easy to order
A(Ber)-Pru, A(Mun)-Sil and you've got a supported attack on Warsaw. On the other
hand, sometimes Germany is so determinedly anti-English that he assists Russia
in Scandinavia in order to get the extra Russian fleets needed to crack open the
North Sea, but this tends to plant the seeds of Germany's downfall in the
mid-game, for reasons discussed later.
Anglo-German
alliances aren't much different in practice. England sends fleets against France
and probably puts an extra couple of units into Scandinavia. Germany pours
armies through Burgundy and gives the English some support in the north. By
1903-4 France is effectively out, England has the outlying French centres and
maybe even St. Petersburg and yet again German armies built in Mun and Ber look
east for the next few centres. After all, it is difficult for Germany to build
fleets quickly enough to take on England single-handed, so it is easier to build
armies instead. Of course, this strategy can be fatally flawed as a few years
later Germany will be very vulnerable to an English stab.
The
Russian Perspective
The
fact that Germany often looks to Russia for the second tranche of supply centres
once the Western triangle is settled is quite logical when you consider the
proximity of the Russian centres, the fact that Germany is essentially a
land-based power, and the influence of Switzerland and the stalemate lines on
geography. In particular, in order to win the game without crossing the
stalemate line Germany needs two or three Russian home centres to stand any
chance of victory.
And
of course the converse also applies. Russia needs to secure her frontiers in the
early game and will be looking for assistance from neighbours to get a foothold
in the Balkans or Scandinavia. This is certain to bring her into conflict with
either Austria and/or Turkey in the south and with either England and/or Germany
in the north. If Russia strikes a good deal in the Balkans and makes early
gains, then it is likely that in the short term Russia will keep sending armies
southwards. But once Russia has got as far as she can easily get (usually the
Vie/Bud line) or as far as she has agreed with her ally, where else can Russia
seek growth? It has to be in Scandinavia and Germany. By this time either
Germany will have let Russia into Scandinavia, there will be an uneasy balance
in the area or England will have monopolised the situation, perhaps even taking
StP.
The
usual Russian game plan in the north would be to take Scandinavia, the North Sea
and maybe the odd English centre while eliminating Germany through encirclement.
And of course if Germany assists Russia in taking Scandinavia he is just
speeding up the process. A continued Russian presence in Scandinavia coupled
with Russian success in the Balkans will, in my opinion, inevitably lead to a
Russian attack on Germany. Indeed, if you consider where Russia is to get 18
centres from, you have Mos, StP, War, Sev, Con, Ank, Smy, Rum, Bul, Gre, Vie,
Bud, Tri, Ven, Swe and Nwy for 16. To win Russia must take mainland Italy
(difficult without a large naval presence), take England (possible with German
help, but Russia can't build fleets that fast) or take Germany. Of these three
options, Germany is the easiest, especially with help from Russian units in
Scandinavia and Austria. Of course, if Turkey is still in the game, then the
need to take the German centres for a victory becomes overwhelming.
So
what does this all mean for Germany? I believe that the mid-game interests of
Germany and Russia in Diplomacy are almost always incompatible and that for real
and lasting success one must take the home centres of the other. Therefore, that
Power which is first able to mount such an attack effectively will have a
decisive advantage and that early strategy for both Powers should be directed at
putting themselves into that position.
There's
More To It Than Just Threatening Italy
If
there is any substance in this analysis, it follows that Germany should try to
keep Russia weak, by denying her Sweden in 1901 and at the very least maintain a
balance of power in Scandinavia to keep the Russian genie well and truly bottled
up in the north. On the premise that my enemy's enemy is my friend, Germany
should support Austria (to deny Russia early builds) and do all in her power to
discourage the emergence of a Russo-Italian alliance or a Juggernaut. The aim
must be to keep Russia isolated and weakened, so that she spends her early game
defending the homeland. If Russia manages to achieve a secure southern flank
then Germany is in trouble. This means that Germany should not neglect to
maintain effect diplomatic connections with countries such as Turkey and
Austria, because by the time the mid-game comes around their position in the
game will directly influence the ability of Russia to wage war on Germany.
I
would go on to say that I think, save for desperate circumstances, that it is a
tactical mistake for Germany to do much by way of supporting Russia against
England. Once Russian fleets get to Norway and the Norwegian Sea it will be
impossible for Germany to push them back on her own. Even when Russia gets into
trouble in the south, all too often a rump Russia can survive in the north for
years and years, denying Germany the Scandinavian centres. If Russia reaches the
North Sea, then Germany is encircled and the odds of Germany withstanding a
determined assault from Russia are slim, especially once a Russian fleet gets
into the Baltic.
Germany
must aim to resolve the western triangle before matters settle down in the east,
so that she can build armies to attack east before Russia is in a position to
build spare armies in Warsaw. Essentially, it doesn't matter how Germany
resolves the E/F/G conflict - an alliance with England makes things difficult
for Russia right from the start, but leaves Germany open to a stab later; an
alliance with France may allow Russia to break out in the north, but may prove
more secure in the longer term. Only remember this: Russia is not really your
friend.
Russia,
on the other hand, should do all in her power to achieve influence in
Scandinavia and hopefully prevent an Anglo-German alliance that could see StP
coming under pressure. If Russia can spare A(Mos) in S01, then the move to StP
must hold out the prospect of increased influence in the north and hence an
early ability to strike west. However, any influence gained in Scandinavia will
be irrelevant in the face of a determined A/T alliance and it is the struggle
for power in the Balkans which must be uppermost in Russia's thoughts. Just as
Germany benefits from an isolated Russia, Russia also benefits from an isolated
Germany, provided the end result isn't an over-mighty England.
To
conclude: if you're Germany it isn't enough to support Austria. Far better to
fix the real enemy - Russia - as soon as possible.
First
published in Spring Offensive 36
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