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STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY Part VII: France
by Harry Drews
France is one of the intrinsically strongest powers on the
Diplomacy board. This strength is due to a number of factors, some of which are:
1) the corner position occupied by France means that any attacks can come from
only two basic directions, north and east; 2) the rule that Switzerland is
impassable is of significant defensive value while it does little to hamper
France’s offense; 3) two builds in 1901 are almost automatic and this
guarantees France a good start; and 4) there is a great deal of flexibility in
France’s builds options and direction of attack. Our basic strategy as the French should be based on the
realisation that if we allow England and Germany to ally then we are doomed. In
addition, simultaneous conflict on the northern and Mediterranean fronts must be
avoided at all costs. In simplified language, we must divide and conquer.
Analysis of the French position can be logically grouped into consideration of
the -three main sectors in turn: Italy, England/Germany, and the east. Our ideal strategy as France is to postpone conflicts with
Italy and first resolve the Anglo-German matter. This is a secure strategy
because Italy alone cannot hope to mount a reasonable offensive against us
unless a bare minimum of four units (the majority of which must be fleets) are
available. In order to build up this armada, Italy needs time to capture some
centres from Austria or Turkey. In the meantime, we as the French can turn our
attention to the north and we will still be able to anticipate the Italian
attack. In any fight with Italy the odds are on our side. Imagine that a funnel
is placed between France and Italy. The narrow end rests on the French coast and
the wide end opens onto Italy and the Central Mediterranean, We will have no
trouble invading Italy if we so choose and yet Italy has a hard time making any
inroads into France and Spain. This quirk in the design of the mapboard should
be used to maximum advantage. If French fortunes should fall, the French defence
against Italy can be stretched out for quite a while as long as we are not being
attacked from the north at the same time. The crucial task we face at the start of the game is to
undermine any formation of’ and English-German agreement. Expend as much
diplomatic sweat and toil that is necessary to ensure that France will be
counted as partner in this critical marriage of’ interests. Whether we ally
with Germany or England is not nearly so important as that we manage to prevent
those two from allying with each other. Should the unthinkable happen, then it
is inevitable that we succumb. At the very best Russia may come to our side and
Italy may respect an agreement of neutrality. Temporary stalemates can be
achieved. Sooner or later Russia will weaken or Italy will invade our sunny,
southern shores and our position blows away with the wind. Let us assume,
however, that fate is kind to us and a deal with either England or Germany is
possible. Which one is preferable as an ally? England makes a good short term
ally as Germany can be crushed with minimal effort (provided Russia plays into
our hands). Supposing that the alliance with England is maintained after the
elimination of’ Germany, then some sort of defence must be left against our
friend England while we carry the fight to the shores of Italy. If no potent
power has coalesced from the turmoil in the east then the conquest of our
Italian neighbour will succeed. At this point we will have eleven centres:
Belgium, Munich, Italy, Tunis and the homeland. Now let us be realistic about
our future chances. Most likely we cannot take the necessary centres from
Austria or Turkey. Too much time will be required and doubtless England will be
coveting our inviting centres back home. Russia, of course, could be doing the
gloating and be sitting in Austria too. The depressing conclusion is that an
alliance with England is not the best means towards a French victory. Suppose we backtrack a bit and the decision to stab England
is made. Whether or not this stab should occur before or after the Italian
adventure will depend on what has happened in the east. If Russia is threatening
England in the north or there is no opposition at all in that area then most
likely England will have been drawn away from our area and the chances for the
stab by us have improved. If there is no early opportunity to slip the blade
into England then we must bide our time and move into the Mediterranean in
force. Unfortunately, no matter which country we attack first, England or Italy,
there will be an interruption in the smooth flow of our expansion. All other
things being equal, the assault on England is preferred because she is the more
dangerous opponent and a few more centres are available on the continent which
can be swept up into our net at the same time. Do not deceive yourself, however.
England is a tough nut to crack and if she is not presented with threats in
other directions a stalemate line can be thrown up in quick order against us. Having examined the possibilities of an alliance with
England to destroy Germany, let us now look at the other side of the coin. The
comparative advantages of allying with Germany rather than England are
immediately apparent. England can be most assuredly overwhelmed; Germany will
usually be more receptive to an alliance with France than with England; and then
because the three island centres can be logically claimed by France, we will
have a secure base from which to launch an offensive against Germany or to
secure our defenses while we venture into the Mediterranean. Our centre count
will register twelve: Tunis, the England and Italian home centres as well as our
own homeland, Add some German and/or Scandinavian and/or Austria centres and a
very merry eighteen centre catch we have indeed. Furthermore, with Germany as
our ally, the threat to ourselves is minimised and one of Russia, Austria or
Turkey can cast a blow for French victory (unintentionally of course) at the
German rear. We are only left with the examination of the roles of the
three eastern powers. Turkey is dangerous because any of her gains are
irreversible from our viewpoint. Turkey can stealthily creep across half of
Europe and block our bid for victory. All our influence must be used to suppress
Turkish expansion. Clearly, Italy, Germany and Russia can serve as buttresses to
contain the Turkish menace and care must be taken to avoid foolish French
tactics which would open the floodgates. This is one of the flaws inherent in an
Anglo-French alliance. Turkey can engulf Russia while Germany and Italy are
being eroded. If we turn to Russia, we see that she can be of definite value as
long as she is not blatantly on top of the pile in the east. Even worse than
Turkish dominance is a working Russo-Italian alliance; should this horrible evil
surface then the game is lost. Finally, we come to Austria. Her ascendancy to
domination will most often prove to be the greatest blessing to France. Austria
will attract the heat while we snatch the goodies. Can we put a game plan for France together? Given a choice,
ally with the person who seems to be the weaker of the English/German duo. An
exception would occur if the Russian player seems to be very capable and has a
strong potential ally in one of the other three eastern players. If this
powerhouse is building in the east then invade Italy quickly to set up your
front line trenches. The north can wait your later attention. If no quick winner
in the east seems to be emerging then you can afford to pursue a northern policy
as was outlined earlier. If you do have to rush into the Mediterranean early in
the game then your chances of victory will be reduced but with a bit of luck you
can settle for a draw and maybe even take those elusive eighteen centres. Reprinted from Paroxysm 9, June 1975. |