II
On Strategy in General

Joseph Wheeler


'Strategy decides the time when, the place where, and the forces with which the engagement is to be fought.'

Here are all of the issues with which we need to concern ourselves when planning strategy. It must be remembered that all wars have a political goal, and thus our strategic planning is the act of deciding how to plan engagements which help us to achieve our goal. In this light, let us examine the case of a French player in Spring 1902. His first step, of course, is to define his goals. Suppose this has been done, and they are found to be 1) Protect French control over France and Iberia and 2) To establish a route of expansion through the Mediterranean. France's available forces are F Mars, F Brest, F Portugal, A Spain, A Burgundy. If the French player merely moves forces into the Mediterranean theater and allows himself to fight sprawling battles wherever the Italian presents himself, he has not done his job. The whole advance should be planned with the end of achieving his goals kept in mind, and each engagement should be planned to help achieve those goals. Thus, France's next logical step might be to decide the F Brest and A Burgundy are best used defensively to protect France and Iberia - how best to accomplish this will be determined by the specific conditions of the game. Additionally, he may realize that the best way to achieve his second goal is to engage the Italian at the Tyrrhenian Sea with A Spain, F Portugal, and F Marseilles. Furthermore, he may realize that his best chance for success lies in not forcing this engagement until 1903, when all appropriate forces may be employed. Thus, a reasonable set of moves would be A Spain -> Marseilles, F Marseilles -> Gulf of Lyon, F Portugal -> MAO. Since these moves are not patently anti-Italian, and may be passed off as preparations against England, France has committed nothing but still progressed well on the accomplishment of his goals. Merely by deciding where, when, and with what to fight France is thus able to increase his chances for ultimate success.


'Possible engagements are to be regarded as real ones because of their consequences.'

Imposing our will on the enemy does not always require battle, but it is always based on the presumption that, should battle come, we would win. Hence, England may convince Russia not to build northern fleets not by taking Sweden or StP, but merely by having the capability to do so if balked. Thus, the goal has been achieved just as though the battle had actually occurred.


'If we do not learn to regard a war, and the seperate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of...undefended provinces are of value in themselves...we ignore the possibility that their possession may later lead to definite disadvantages.'

Often, players are far more concerned with taking supply centers than is good for them. Until a Power is within striking distance of winning the game, SC acquisition should make a distant secondary concern to the real issues - staying alive and maintaining a route of expansion. Indeed, a rashly taken province often turns out to be more a liability than an asset, one fact too often forgotten. Is it truly an advantage for Germany to grab Warsaw at the earliest possible opportunity? Given the initial startup, it is quite possible for the German player to achieve this objective, by say A Berlin -> Prussia, A Munich -> Silesia. However, such a strategy violates both of the general concerns of the starting Power - it does not open a profitable line of expansion, and it leaves Germany open to assault from the west. Given the Russian's likely response, the necessary expenditure of forces to keep Warsaw would, in all likelihood, present England and/or France with just too good an opportunity to slice up poor Germany.


'Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity will do a thousand times more damage than audacity.'

The bold player enjoys all of the advantages in an evenly matched fight - the possibility of surprise, the initiative, and the ability to gain at the other's expense. This is not to say that you should rashly rush in and attack without thought - such a simplistic strategy can never work against an opponent better prepared and more careful in his planning. The message is simply that, all things being equal, it is better to fight on the enemy's territory than your own. Let us use the example of the Italian - the Italian's primary concern in the early stages of the game is to prevent any foreign power from projecting their naval force into the Mediterranean. This cause is best served not be staking claim to Tunis and using your (now) two fleets to carefully barricade yourself across the Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas. Such a plan is doomed to failure, since someone will eventually venture your way, and it only takes one lucky move for them to start taking you apart. Rather, Italy MUST take hold of her own destiny, and take the battle to whichever power is mostly likely to threaten her first (usually Turkey or France). By taking the war to the opponent, any territory which changes hands will probably be in your favor. Also, most Dip players don't really like fighting unpredictable and bold opponents, and often make more mistakes when forced to.


'To achieve strength at the decisive point depends on the strength of the army and on the skill with which this strength is deployed.'

This point has two important rules which accompany it. The first rule is: put the largest possible army into the field. Superiority of numbers IS important. The second rule is: know the decisive point. Since it is not always possible to know where the decisive point in a struggle will be, always attempt to maintain the initiative so that YOU can dictate the location of decisive battles. Neither of these rules is sufficient, which is good because neither is very profound. They only take on importance when coupled with the immediate goal - being strong where needed. It is not enough for Russia to have more units than any of her potential opponents - she must have more units facing each of her actual opponents. If the point of decision is in the south, then every unit in the north is not contribiting to the decision, and Russia may find herself absolutely superior, but locally inferior. Such situations can be tragic.


'The forces available must be employed with such skill that even in the absence of absolute superiority, relative superiority is attained at the decisive point.'

Here we are again with the decisive point. This time, let's look at the same example from Turkey's point of view. Assuming an 'average' 1901 haul, let's say Turkey has four SCs, Russia six. In a struggle between the two, Sevastopol and the surrounding provinces are the point of decision. Despite Turkey's overall inferiority, he may well manage to exert local superiority, especially if the Russian must commit an unusually large force to its north. Turkey can usually count on getting a second fleet first, which assures control of the Black Sea. Furthermore, if Rumania is Russian, then an equivalent force of three units may be brought to bear on either Rumania or Sevastopol, since breaking support to a province is equivalent to supporting an attack into it. If the Russian is sorely pressed in the north, this should constitute a local superiority - otherwise the goal is unreasonable and the battle probably should not have been undertaken in the first place.


'The two factors that produce surprise are secrecy and speed.'

Both elements are crucial, yet all too often only secrecy is acknowledged. This rule can be used to seperate the 'good stab' from the 'bad stab'. Both are undertaken in secrecy - the distinguishing point is speed. The 'bad stab' incurs the wrath of another Power by taking one or more of his SCs by unexpected moves - what makes it bad is that the other Power is still around to exact revenge. A 'good stab' will never exact the revenge of the stabee, because he will no longer exist in a powerful enough state to make good on his revenge. Prefereably, he will no longer exist at all. Whenever considering a stab of your partner, ask yourself one question: Can I be effectively counter-attacked after this? If the answer is yes, then it is not a good stab. There are three expected results which can make a stab 'good'. They are, in order of preference 1)Victory - the stab will give you 18 centers; 2) Elimination - the stabee will be dead; 3) Domination - the stabee will be reduced to an ineffectual power. Anything less than this and you are inviting retaliation.


'Only the commander who imposes his will can take the enemy by surprise.'

If the enemy decides where each battle will be, you cannot surprise him. Only the player with a positive aim can surprise his opponent. Put another way, a France who allows England to take MAO and English Channel cannot take England by surprise, for England has command of the area, and may dictate when and with what battles will be fought.


'Strategic feints rarely have the desired effect.'

Forces deployed far from your intended opponent for appearance's sake are in danger of finding themselves unable to contribute to the battle. An unused unit is worse than one used improperly. A Russia who believes the crucial point to be the Balkans should never send A Moscow to StP to simulate war with England. The danger is far too great that Turkey and Austria will sieze the opportunity to crack a Russia playing one unit short. Strategic feints only work if the feinting unit can still strike into the intended theater of operations. Hence, Italy may feint against Austria to strike at Turkey, since the feint itself brings Italy's units into range.


'All forces intended and available for a strategic purpose should be applied simulatenously.'

This serves as an excellent point with which to sum up this chapter. If you're going to hit somebody, hit them fast, hard, and well. Don't hold back troops, don't engage one unit at a time - your goal is to end the war as quickly as possible. The longer you stay deadlocked with an opponent, the bigger the window of opportunity for someone else to gain at your expense.

Read the next article (Defense)

Joseph Wheeler
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