Geographical Destiny Revisited

Does A Bud go to Serbia rather than towards Munich only because we are playing a non-optimal game? Of course not, we send it towards Serbia because Serbia is empty and can be taken with a flick of the wrist. The same cannot be said of Munich, and here we are at the heart of the matter: The fear factors calculated by Windsor are "timeless", assuming that every center is equally easy/difficult to occupy. In S1901, this is hardly the case.

Assuming that it is rational (and not just "conventional wisdom") to go after one’s "naturals", we must investigate the impact of this to get a clearer picture of what’s going on, because it really does makes a difference. While a move such as A Bud-Ser does not change the distance between Austrian and German home centers, it alters the distance between Austrian units and Turkish home centers (and, when including naturals, the distance between Austrian and Turkish (and Russian) centers (Serbia and Bulgaria)), and with this, not only does the swiftest way to victory change, but also the fear factors..

If we are to include "naturals" and other SC’s in the analysis, an attempt must be made to construct a map according to how it might look after the respective powers have aquired (or tried to aquire) their naturals (one might think of it as a tiny collection of possible situations after the 1901 builds). Many simplifications and assumptions must be made, some numbers must be taken out of thin air while others are collected from other sources ("A Statistical Look at 1901" by The Scribe, Spring 1998 issue of The Zine).

• Austria is assumed to taken Serbia and Greece.
• England is assumed to have Norway (50% chance of taking it with a fleet and 50% chance of taking it with an army), and to have a fleet in the North Sea.
• France is assumed to have taken Spain and Portugal (possibility of sc of Spain ignored).
• Germany is assumed to have taken Denmark and Holland (fleet/army possibilities ignored).
• Italy is assumed to have taken Tunis (50% chance of taking it with a fleet, 50% chance of taking it with an army, 50% chance of there being an Italian fleet in the Ionian Sea).
• Russia is assumed to have a 70% chance of taking Sweden (the remaining 30% represents the fleet being in the Gulf of Bothnia) and a 75% chance of taking Rumania (38% of the time taking it with an army, 37% of the time with a fleet)(Rumania is assumed to be vacant 25% of the time).
• Turkey is assumed to have taken Bulgaria.
• Belgium is assumed to be vacant 25% of the time, the remaining 75% being split equally between England, France and Germany (Germany and France occupying Belgium with armies, England split 12.5%/12.5% between fleet/army occupation).

Of the countless possibilities that is not accounted for in this least, the most glaring omission might be moves to highly important, disputed provinces such as Galicia, The Black Sea, The English Channel etc. Surely one cannot attempt to picture 1901 more or less accuratly without these? What will be attempted is to analyse the impact of powers going after their naturals, not all the various ways of which they may be going after each other’s throats. Moves to such highly DMZ'd provinces fall in the throat-cutting cathegory and generally does not represent attempts by powers to grab neutrals. Besides, the frequency of such moves are much more likely to be affected both by trends and "conventional wisdom" than moves aimed at grabbing empty neutrals, which ought to be guided by nothing but rationality. The postulated presence of an English fleet in the North Sea, and the chance of an Italian fleet in the Ionian are included, because they are highly probable moves that represent steps towards aquiring naturals, steps that causes a significant change in the tempi required to reach other powers' centers (which cannot be said of e.g. moves to Ruhr or Ukraine). Armed with these assumptions and ignoring all other possible moves, we will build a "swiftest route to victory" for each of the powers, following the example of Paul Windsor:

Every power has been "alotted" 3 tempi to expand (Though Russia could reach 18 centers  in only 2 tempi, why should it be punished for its flexibility?), Turkey one extra tempo (without which it would not reach 18 centers). The possibility of England taking Sev has been deemed too far-fetched and Sev has not been included in the English list.

Using Windsor’s system of assigning values to centers (whereby a center that can be reached in 1 tempo is given a value of 5, 2 tempi is valued at 4 etc), and giving equal weight to home SC’s and naturals (a power looking to count up18 centers does not differentiate, and so neither will we), we calculate the fear factors:

Not surprisingly, the "primal" central powers Austria and Germany fares poorly. While it’s a close race in fear perceived, Germany projects more (most, in fact) fear and does better in terms of net fear, but both powers are far behind the rest of the field in this respect, reflecting their difficult strategical situation. While their fear of each other is considerable, it is nonetheless clearly overridden by fear of other neighbours. The inclusion of other SC’s reveals England to be power most feared by Germany and Austria’s fear of Turkey is now as great as his fear of Italy.

The two witches obviously doesn’t have the same appetite for centers as the central powers (and Russia), but as they are subject to only half the amount of fear, they emerge as the clear winners in terms of net fear. This is as expected, taken their superior strategical position. The struggle for the Balkan SC’s brings Turkey’s fear of Austria into light, while complications in Scandinavia drives England’s fear of Russia up.

The numbers for France may seem surprising. Barely managing to reach a positive net fear, it’s projected fear is the least of all the powers. This is partly explained by the fact that while most powers close the distance to their neighbours (and their naturals) in taking their naturals, France does not do so in tying up the Iberian SC’s. Thusly, the other powers increases their projected fear more than France does. Likewise, they are subjected to more fear, while France keeps the perceived fear down, almost on the level of the witches. Perhaps the lack of projected fear is one of the keys to French success, with the other powers preferring to concentrate against neighbours that appear more threatening? After all, none of the powers seem to look at France as their biggest threat.

Italy benefits hugely from the inclusion of the neutral SC’s, giving it a host of targets beside the easily-reached Austrian centers. Combined with the lack of manouver towards Italy by other powers, Italy ends up with a nice net projected fear. Is this indication of Italian strength nothing but an illusion? Italy is always a special case, but Italy anno 1901 is truly special. With his home SC’s like a castle not likely to come under attack, he at most leaves A Ven for defense and engages in whatever endeavor pleases him. Centrally placed, Italy has a long reach, from Turkey to Portugal and deep into Germany. That some of those provinces are very hard to get at is not sufficently accounted for in these numbers, neither is the strategical horrors that may follow if Italy attempts to grab the most accessible centers. For a broader discussion of Italy, see "Geography is Destiny".

Just how compatible are the various powers? Let’s use the information in the table for the swiftest route to victory and try to find out. If one power covets a large number of the centers listed for another power, the percentage of compatability will be low (percentages in "Shortest route to victory" are ignored).

Austria is a mess… Not only is it surrounded by neighbours that all have a strategical edge over it, but most of the relationships with those neighbours have a low compatability as well. Accepting the friendship of Germany seems a good choice, as the two have good compatability and this will cut some of the pressure. Russia appears to be the best potential buddy among the three Balkan brawlers. Turkey looks a hopeless choice, it is in fact the most shaky relationship possible in Diplomacy, with a combined compatablity of only 15%. Peace with Italy is a must, but the relationship is unlikely to last, being the second most unstable on the board with a combined compatability of 28%.

England has some pleasant choices. It can accept working short-term with Germany, knowing that the relationship is horribly one-sided strategically (as bas as Turkey/Austria) and that the route to glory goes through Germany’s guts. Or it can side with the more compatible France, still having the strategical edge. Coaxing Italy into attacking one of the two seems a good idea, as Italy is unlikely to get in England’s way. Ignoring the threats poised by Germany and France while going after Russia early in the game cannot be recommended without serious diplomatic framework and G/F conflict.

France sees England as being the most compatible among the westerners, but may choose the strategically sounder relationship with Germany, altough Germany is likely to reap the biggest harvest from this partnership if France doesn’t demand some donations (Germany rating it at 29%, France at 15%). France seems little concerned with Italy as long as the latter stays away from the French centers, seeing Italy almost as compatible as Russia.

Germany, being centrally located, has access to centers that is out of England’s reach and accordingly, while recognizing its strategical akwardness, has a more optimistic opinion about the compatability of the relationship, putting it on par with one with Russia. From the German view, France is clearly the best bet among the powers in the west/north, being strategically more equal and slightly more compatible. Compared to Austria, even the powers seen as least compatible by Germany have a higher compatability than any of Austria's Balkan neighbours.

Italy should have little doubt about its dream partner: England. Among the eastern triplet, Russia is as expected the most compatible, but at 33% it signals that Italy may encounter some "friendly" competition at some point. Austria is bound to end up on the Italian menu, but whether it will it be breakfast, lunch or dinner is likely to depend on the bigger picture. Italy’s strategical edge will dissapate quickly if it goes veering off while leaving a healthy Austria behind. While Turkey seems more likely to come Italy’s way than France, France seems more likely to succeed, with its positional edge over Italy.

Russia seems to enjoy an advantage over Germany, who is the power seen as both the most feared and incompatible. Austria and Turkey looks equally compatible, with Austria being the easiest to bring down. Baring the traditionally one-sidedness of a Juggernaut in mind (expressed by Russia rating the relationship at 32%, Turkey at 15%), it is surprising that numbers indicate that Russia’s best bet may be to side with Austria. In the north, war with England seems to be disadvantagous, and England is actually seen as more compatible (but far more dangerous) than Italy, who meanwhile is a good partner in crime for the Balkans. Naturally, France is the most compatible partner.

Turkey’s view of Austria exactly mirrors England’s view of Germany – a power that must be overrun, but a useful short-term partner because it is strategically inferior. Russia is easier to work with, but conflict seems difficult to avoid, and Russia will gain the greater spoils. Italy will probably have to be engaged at some point too, but there seems to be potential for mutual existence, both seeing the relationship as being farely equal.

Looking over these relationships, one is stricken by a similarity between France and Russia that could be another key in understanding the success of these two powers: Their neighbours find it hard to cooperate. In the northwest, both powers borders England and Germany. In the southwest, France has an Italian neighbour that is tied up with Austria, while Russia faces Austria and Turkey in the southeast. Another peculiarity that is to Austrian comfort is that all of its neighbours have some reason to keep Austria alive (at least for a while) – Russia and Turkey because Austria seems to be their best partner in an alliance, and Italy because of Turkey (and, to some extent, Russia).

At the end of "Geography is Destiny", Windsor challenges a number of conventional principles, which will be discussed:

• "A/T is a poor alliance (it appears to be better for both powers than allying with Russia)." As it is the least compatible (and one of the most one-sided) of all alliances, one could hardly call it "good", at least not for Austria, who seems to be better off allying with Russia.

• "R/T is a good alliance (it certainly is good for Russia, but why should Turkey be so ready to aid and abet the superior growth potential of the neighbour which constitutes its greatest threat?)." Austria seems to be as large a threat to Turkey as Russia is, but even if Russia is easier to work with, Turkey’s best option could be to ally short-term with the strategically inferior Austria. And could it be that R/A is an even better choice for Russia than R/T?

• "Germany should prefer allying with France (when allying with England would appear to provide the better leverage against two powers Germany fears more than England)." England does seem to be the power most feared by Germany, and the alliance with England is strategically horrible for Germany. France does seem a much better choice. However, the combined fear factors of Russia and France are sobering and suggests that Germany should be very vary of getting in bed with France if Russia is going strong. Also, there is a possibility that Germany’s superior growth in an alliance with England could enable him to cover his turf. The best climate for an attack on France would be with Italy joining in and England tied up north with Russia.

• "Germany and Austria are natural allies (when each appears to have a natural interest in the other's home centers)." They certainly do, but they are well-compatible powers, and the fear they face from their other respective neighbors far outrank their fear of each other. This suggests that their energies are better spent elsewhere, at least in the first stages of the game.

• "Germany and Russia are natural enemies (geography indicates that A/G/R is another "triangle" contest in the game, so why should two members of that triangle always automatically foreclose the idea of allying against the interests of the third -- and others in the game?)." In terms of fear and compatibility, Russia actually seems a better partner than England for Germany, but Germany wouldn’t enjoy a better growth rate in this alliance and still seems strategically worse off. At the same time, Germany is the power seen as both the most feared and least compatible by Russia. They could take on England in the north, but my guess is that Germany should be careful in doing this unless France is under pressure from Italy (or allied with England). With Germany’s view of England in mind, bouncing Russia in Sweden should by no means be automatic. Germany should have little interest in joining an attack on Austria, and while Austria would like to work with Russia, taking on Germany should have a low priority.

• "Germany is a western power and should initially focus on the west (when his cumulative Fear Factor among eastern powers is greater than among western)." Including neutral SC’s into the equation seems to place Germany firmly in the west, or rather – the northwest, as his two biggest worries seems to be England and Russia.

Given that grabbing one’s naturals is rational, and not just another piece of conventional wisdom, it would seem that many of these findings supports the latter.