StP and the Mind-Body Interface of Diplomacy

By  Dan Shoham

The Body and Mind of Diplomacy Diplomacy is not Chess: Good decisions and play choices are not driven solely by body aspects such as the design of the board, placement of pieces, and rules of movement. Rather, mind aspects, such as the disposition of the opponent players and interplayer relationships, are of dominant significance (the term opponent is used here to indicate any player other than oneself -- even if they appear to be "allies"). With that said, the texture of the body elements should be understood -- and understood well -- as it can provide an objective starting point around which to develop game strategies and diplomatic plays. Arguably, one of the less-appreciated aspects of Diplomacy is this body-mind interface. Perhaps this under-appreciation is a consequence of the bifurcation of player preferences. Some (perhaps most) players focus on the mind aspect of the game. They are equally open-minded to any plausible alliance (until game developments start dictating otherwise) and drive their decisions based on how they feel about the other players. While a good mind-oriented-player is aware of the need for decent tactical play and understands that ultimately any good diplomacy needs to be expressed through the body of the game, they still feel that the game of Diplomacy is primarily about, well, diplomacy. Anyone who firmly agrees with the statement I'd rather be a master negotiator and a mediocre tactician than the other way around, is a mind-oriented player. Mind-oriented players find an appealing purity in the simplicity of the game's rules and view the map as nearly homogenous. They are happy that these body aspects, a distraction from the mind of the game, are minimized. Other (perhaps a minority) of players excel in tactical play -- knowing how to work out combinations and develop master development play. They select comfortable allies and proceed to out-maneuver lousy tacticians or opponents that can't get their act together. These body-oriented players develop their game based on setting tactical goals and achieving them. Some players are very good at both aspects, but every player has a preference (which may change from game to game, or even during a game) and a stronger side. What is rather rare, are players who thrive in the middle: Players who look at elements of the body of the game and use them in developing the mind-oriented play strategy, and vice versa. One example of body-mind interface play involves stalemate-line oriented strategies. Many players think of stalemate lines as a late-game feature or as a map quirk that can sometimes be exploited to stop someone from winning or avoid elimination by superior forces. Some even consider them to be unintended map design defects. Stalemate-oriented players begin thinking about stalemate lines right from the start of the game and align their diplomatic strategies around their texture. It is a very powerful Diplomatic tool to be able to say to someone "I have a stalemate line, therefore �," or "if we work together, we can secure this stalemate line and then negotiate from a position of strength ...." The StP Asymmetry Perhaps no province is as prominent as StP with respect to mind-body interface implications. This distinction comes from a powerful asymmetry that shatters any semblance of map homogeneity. StP is not just another province. It is, as one might say, a nexus of distortion in the time-space continuum. A distortion so powerful, that it forces the typically-enigmatic mind-body-interface to the forefront. Big words? Bombastic analogies? Perhaps. Read on and judge for yourself! If only one thing is to be remembered about StP, it is its pronounced asymmetry: It is incredibly easy to hold StP from the west, yet impossible to hold it from the east. The first assertion -- that it is incredibly easy to hold StP from the west -- is a consequence of its dearth of eastern neighbors: Only LVN and MOS adjoin StP from the east. A simple defensive line of NWY (or BAR or FIN or GoB) supporting StP is all that is needed to permanently shield it from any eastern power (one without fleets in the Atlantic areas). To be formal, there should also be a unit in DEN or SWE (technically, even FIN) to prevent a land attack on the supporting unit, launched through DEN. One thus notes that a defensive perimeter of NWY-STP-DEN requires three units to maintain and garrisons four supply centers for a net surplus of one center (or break-even if SWE is held rather than DEN). It doesn't get much easier than that! The second assertion -- that it is impossible to hold StP from the east -- is a consequence of the fact that StP is adjoined by four spaces (BAR, NWY, FIN, GoB) from the west. Therefore, StP can not be defended by an eastern power against a western power that is motivated enough to bring four units to bear against StP. Even if StP is defended by someone who does have a bit of a Western Fleet (e.g., Russia), adding a fleet in BAR or GoB (or both) would still not properly defend StP since those fleets themselves can not be defended. A western attacking force of four fleets can systematically eliminate these defender fleets and proceed to capture StP -- no matter how many supply centers the eastern power controls! In fact, the minimal eastern defensive line that includes StP also includes NWY, SWE, FIN, BAR and GoB (StP and BAR support NWY, FIN and GoB support SWE). This minimal line also requires that LVN be in friendly hands. Not only is this is a very expensive line to maintain (requiring seven units and garrisoning three supply centers for a net cost of four units), but it also requires at least two western fleets (and hence is impossible for the pure eastern powers -- Austria, Italy -- and Turkey, to accomplish). Since this minimal line is so far forward that StP is not even on the front line (StP does not adjoin even one hostile space), the statement remains: StP can't be held from the east! If two things are to be remembered about StP, the second should be: Once Russia loses StP it is reduced to the status of an eastern power. Technically, Russia must also lose all its Atlantic fleets to completely become an eastern power. However, in practice, the process of capturing StP by a western power will typically cause the elimination of such fleets in any event and even if some survive they can not be defended for very long. Knowing that, Russian players often select such fleets for removal in the relevant adjustment (and sometime even retreat) phases. While StP may be the only supply center province that suffers from such a stark asymmetry, another center -- POR -- also sports a strong, although different, asymmetry. POR, as it is widely known, can be a component of the smallest genuine stalemate line (POR and ECH support MAO, by a player who controls the English home centers and with no other players having Atlantic fleets or the ability to construct them: This line requires three units and protects four centers for a net surplus of one). POR, however, unlike StP, can also be defended from the east and therefore once captured by an eastern power (or an eastern-allied power) it cannot be counted on to eventually form a part of a western line. (POR, interestingly enough, is also the linchpin of the smallest genuine eastern stalemate line: POR and WES support SPA, NAF hold, CON hold, ARM hold, by a player who controls the Turkish home centers and TUN and with no other players having Mediterranean fleets or the ability to construct them: This line requires six units and protects six centers for a break-even position). While, perhaps not powerful enough to drive strategic play on its own, the POR asymmetry does serve to further accentuate the significance of the one at StP. This is because when the two are combined, a mere series of map quirks begins to assume the relevance of a strategic backbone. Such a cross-over is the essence of the mind-body interface discussed earlier. English StP Strategy The term English Strategy indicates a strategy that is appropriate to be played by England. However, it can just as well be played by any western power or alliance that has succeeded in eliminating or allying with England. Of course, when a strategy is applied by an alliance, then the mechanic of the alliance's own stability is also a factor. In this discussion, the term English player will be used in a generic form to indicate any player or alliance who could employ an English strategy. The power of the English StP strategy is so pronounced that it should be seriously contemplated -- or at least understood -- by all western powers. As outlined above, the combined StP and POR asymmetric positions allow for a strong English line to be held with an excellent economy of forces (NWY support StP, DEN hold, POR and ECH supports MAO): six units defending eight centers for a surplus of two. No other realistic position on the Diplomacy board provides an economy that is even remotely as attractive. The surplus is very important. It means that the English player can secure the line while still a mid-size power (eight centers) and still have two extra units with which to participate in further play. Actually, the English player will have available a lot more firepower than the two units since not all six stalemate units are required to be issuing defensive orders every turn. They can also advance, provided that they are assured of having the option of falling back. Even if they do not advance, the unit in StP (particularly if its an Army) and the fleet in MAO can provide support orders to activities within their respective neighborhoods. Even with the extra firepower, two units may not sound like much, but it is actually a lot when wielded by a power that cannot be eliminated and can never lose those units (if destroyed, they may be rebuilt). The Diplomatic implication of these unspoken (or spoken) circumstances can't be underestimated. Anyone who stabs the English player knows that eventually they will have to reach an accommodation with England -- not the best incentive to stab. Anyone who allies with England knows that their ally can't be distracted by threats to its own security. England can test-drive risky allies or strategies knowing that if things do not work out well, it will live to be able to try something else. One can go on and list many other tactical and diplomatic advantages. Having motivated the huge benefits of achieving this StP-POR position, there remains this minor detail of how to get there. The simple answer is that the English player should target StP first. There are four reasons for this answer: It's closer to England. There are many neutral centers to be captured on the way. Once secured, most forces can be withdrawn from the area. As discussed, a concerted effort simply cannot fail, since StP cannot be defended from the east. As long as Russia is prevented from advancing to the minimal eastern defensive line described above (StP and BAR support NWY, FIN and GoB support SWE), success of an English player's attack on StP is assured. As noted above, a force of four units can secure StP, reduce Russia into becoming an eastern power, and anchor the entire Scandinavian area. Once captured, only two units are needed to defend the front (three, if DEN or SWE also needs to be garrisoned), and the rest of the force (as well as units built on account of the captured centers) can proceed to other missions: Eliminating hostile Atlantic fleets, accounting for hostile Atlantic navy yards (a navy yard is a coastal home supply center of a power that is still alive), and capturing POR. Once StP is captured, it is often wise to garrison it with a fleet. As seductive as it may be to get an army into position and continue the campaign against Russia -- or at least retain the option of quickly resuming it in the future -- it is actually better to leave Russia alone. This is because once Russia's ability to interfere with the English strategy has been neutralized, her continued existence and health is actually beneficial to the English player (particularly if the English player is, in fact, England). Anything that a healthy Russia does will have the effect of tying down forces away from the Atlantic shores and waters -- where the remaining English objectives are. When Russia can no longer hurt the English player and the English player has created (by the docking of a fleet in StP) a situation in which he can't hurt the Russian player, then Russia --- regardless of how it feels and what it says -- is effectively an ally of the most solid kind. (This advice goes away if the "English" player is actually Germany or an alliance that incorporate Germany. In that case, a weak Russia and a continuation of the anti-Russian campaign are usually preferred, and hence an army is better in StP) Conclusions One could go so far as to suggest that this overall strategy should be viewed as the default play for the English player. Correspondingly, one could argue that the primary aim of the default Russian western play and diplomacy should be to frustrate this English strategy. The shape of the board, the body of the game, demands it. The term default play, here, indicates that it should only be overridden if there are strong and incompatible interplayer dynamics issues. The position objective inherent in this play is simply too powerful to be on par with what may be achievable with other plausible plays. The choice of allies and alliance objectives should thus be driven by the desire to be able to execute this default play. Rather than the nearly-automatic mind-over-body zeitgeist of Diplomacy -- where interplayer dynamics drive the choice of strategy -- this default play suggests a body-over-mind strategic situation. How should the two be reconciled? Well, that's the mind-body-interface challenge -- brought to the surface by the StP asymmetry!     Dan Shoham ([email protected]) If you wish to e-mail feedback on this article to the author, and clicking on the mail address above does not work for you, feel free to use the "Dear DP..." mail interface.