VI
War Plans

Joseph Wheeler


'War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled.'

This is our goal, and what we have slogged through the preceding five articles to understand - designing a unified War Plan which will guide our nation. When doing so, we must consider two prime factors: what we hope to achieve and how we shall achieve it. The first depends on our political goals, and the second on the principles discussed above. We will now reexamine the most important of those principles, this time purely in the context of strategic planning for political gain.

'No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to do.'

Here is our first, and most important, concern. If we do not keep the political goal in mind, our plans will lack direction and rarely achieve the desired effect. One area where this is a constant problem is the early relations between the Balkan powers. Consider the case of Italy. Italy has three common options for an early opponent: she can fight France, Austria, or Turkey. Furthermore, she has three common goals at the outset: survival, access to a route of expansion, and naval dominance in the Mediterranean. Now, try reconciling these goals with each potential opponent.

France: An early war against France requires total committment of the Italian forces, and leaves Italy vulnerable to an Austrian stab or Turkish war of opportunity. Furthermore, less than total support by the English and Germans will leave the war deadlocked, a situation where France can much more easily come up with an extra center to tip the balance than can Italy. Success will open up a limited route of expansion, but one which is easily shut off by a strong English power. Finally, France will respond by building a Mediterranean naval force, and even success requires a strong English naval presence, so this war will not help Italy establish naval superiority.

Austria: This does have several merits, among them a handy route of expansion and opportunities to build up a strong navy - especially as France is unlikely to invest in a Meditteranean force while Italy is oriented eastward. On the downside, success requires Russian and/or Turkish alliances, and Italy's partner(s) usually end up gaining more than Italy. Finally, this plan all but ensures that Turkey will build up a sizable Mediterranean fleet, and Italy is the only logical target once Austria falls.

Turkey: By far the most attractive plan if one is able to choose which war to engage in. This plan requires an Austrian alliance, but Austria is unlikely to become a naval power in any event. The collapse of Turkey yields the Turkish centers as wells as a path of access to the Balkans and Southern Russia, as well as allowing Italy to mount a convergent attack on Austria later. At the successful conclusion of the war, Italy should be the only significant Mediterranean naval power, and has a choice of three for her next opponent. Survival is generally not a problem with this plan unless Austria is turned.

'The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side.'

Not all wars are total wars, and committing fully to a side theater can have disastrous results. Early occupation of Belgium is often such an issue. England, France, and Germany often desire this province, and each has an equal initial claim to it. However, Belgium is not crucial to the defense of any of these Powers, and it provides only marginal expansion opportunities. Therefore, it is not logical to commit a substantial portion of one's force to the taking of Belgium in Fall 1901 unless there is already a greater intent, on either side, to engage in a wider war with the other claimant(s). If you enjoy a general spirit of cooperation with the other claimant(s), then you can usually better profit by renouncing your rights to Belgium in exchange for an affirmation of your rights elsewhere. If you intend to enter a general war with the other claimant(s), then by all means commit to the taking of Belgium - it has ceased to be a matter of limited aims, but is rather a key province in a total war. If your attitude is generally neutral toward the other claimant(s), then one is usually best served by attempting to secure Belgium with only those units which are easily spared - ie, those which are not better used in the achievement of more important goals. This should serve as a guideline for any limited goal.

'An offensive war requires above all a quick, irresistable decision.'

The attacker's primary strength is surprise. His goal is to fully exploit the mobility which a major invasion employs, and to avoid the paralysis that sets in during a long, protracted war. France's first opponent must come from England, Germany, and Italy. Each potential opponent provides opportunities, and each can prove a profitable victim - as long as the war is short. If France allows herself to be tied down facing any one of the three, either of the other two can open a new front while she is least prepared. Even if no other Power attacks, more astute players will take the opportunity to grow unchecked while their neighbors remain locked in deadlocked wars. As a rule of thumb, offensive wars should not be undertaken unless one has a plan prepared which increases the chances of a speedy victory, and peace should be made as soon as the offensive stalls. Applied to the example above, this means France should only attack one of her neighbors when an ally can be found to open a convergent flank or that neighbor is over- extended in the opposite direction, and peace should be made as soon as France has no immediate gains available. Keep attacks short and concentrated, so that you are always able to strike in a new direction when the old one has been exhausted.

'In general one tends to lose more from occupation by the enemy than one gains from conquering his territory, even if the value of both areas should be identical.'

A Power's home centers are its major organs. While it is nice to rip out the opponent's heart, what good does it do us if we lose our own in the process? Retention of one's own territry is always a matter of more direct concern. Consider the example of England mounting a major offensive against Russia through Scandinavia. The English player realizes that he can smash Russia's northern defenses, but only if he strips the British Isles of all military units. If France is currently occupied to the south, this may not be such a bad thing, but otherwise he should be more concerned with defending his island.

'The defender's purpose...is to keep his territory inviolate, and to hold it for as long as possible.'

This is the defender's goal in the face of overwhelming odds. Even if Austria is attacked in force from the very first move, he can often make it to the endgame simply by slowing the enemy's offensive to a crawl. The longer Austria holds out, the greater the chances that the coalition against him will break up, either through internal problems or an external threat. Austria's War Plan in this situation is to make life as difficult as possible for the invaders, and to spend as much diplomatic effort as possible breaking up the coalition.

'...The first principle is: act with the utmost concentration.'

The more units supporting a given action, the greater the odds of success. Therefore, determine the most important theater(s) and concentrate your troops there. As a related point, one should not, as a general rule, invade areas that lengthen your border more than they contribute in supplies. For example: Italy has a northern border which can be held against all land attacks with three units, and against all attacks by any one neighbor with two units. If Italy annexes Munich, however, she now requires seven units to guarantee the same level of security. Munich itself only supplies one unit, so Italy's new border has a defecit of three units in defesibility compared to her original border. This is fine if Munich is simply the first step in a much larger invasion, but obviously this is not a good permanent border - achievement of this border should NOT be a goal in her War Plan.

'The second principle is: act with the utmost speed.'

Achieve your goals as quickly as possible. War Plans are based on the current political and military environment, and your goal is to take advantage of that environment before it changes. If you are playing Turkey and you decide to attack Russia while he has all his forces in the north, facing England, your goal is to end your war before he has a chance to patch things up with England. If those northern units suddenly find themselves free to face you in the south, a sure thing can turn sour quickly.

'Every pause between one success and the next gives the enemy new opportunities.'

Joseph Wheeler
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